Германские языки | Филологический аспект №09 (137) Сентябрь 2026

Базовые и производные эмоции: онтологический статус в языке

Чурюканова Елена Олеговна
канд. филол. наук, доцент кафедры английской филологии и переводоведения, ГОУ ВО МО «Государственный гуманитарно-технологический университет, РФ, г. Орехово-Зуево, Edellvise@yandex.ru, SPIN-код: 5121-0220, AuthorID: 772166

Аннотация: В статье рассматривается проблема онтологического статуса базовых и производных эмоций в языке. Обосновывается положение о том, что эмоции существуют в языке не только как номинации внутренних психических состояний, но и как сложные семантические, когнитивные и дискурсивные образования, отражающие способы категоризации эмоционального опыта. Особое внимание уделяется разграничению базовых и производных эмоций с точки зрения психологии, когнитивной лингвистики и лингвистики эмоций. Базовые эмоции рассматриваются как относительно универсальные и семантически первичные категории, связанные с телесностью, эволюционно значимыми реакциями и минимальными оценочными схемами. Производные эмоции интерпретируются как результат когнитивной, социальной и культурной переработки первичных эмоциональных состояний. Показано, что язык не только фиксирует различия между базовыми и производными эмоциями, но и формирует способы их осмысления через номинации, метафоры, оценочные конструкции, синтаксические модели и дискурсивные практики. Делается вывод о том, что онтологический статус эмоций в языке имеет двойственную природу: с одной стороны, эмоции соотносятся с психофизиологической реальностью, с другой — приобретают собственное языковое и культурно-семиотическое бытие.
Ключевые слова: базовые эмоции, производные эмоции, онтологический статус, язык, лингвистика эмоций, эмоциональный концепт, категоризация, семантика эмоций, эмотивность, когнитивная лингвистика.

Churyukanova Elena Olegovna
PhD in Philology, Associate Professor of the Department of English Philology and Translation Studies State Educational Institution of Higher Education of the Moscow Region "State Humanitarian and Technological University", Russian Federation, Orekhovo-Zuyevo

Abstract: The article examines the ontological status of basic and derived emotions in language. It argues that emotions exist in language not only as nominations of internal psychological states but also as complex semantic, cognitive and discursive formations reflecting culturally mediated ways of categorizing emotional experience. Special attention is paid to the distinction between basic and derived emotions from the perspectives of psychology, cognitive linguistics and linguistics of emotions. Basic emotions are viewed as relatively universal and semantically primary categories associated with bodily experience, evolutionarily significant reactions and minimal evaluative patterns. Derived emotions are interpreted as the result of cognitive, social and cultural elaboration of primary emotional states. The article demonstrates that language not only records the distinction between basic and derived emotions but also shapes their interpretation through nomination, metaphor, evaluative structures, syntactic patterns and discursive practices. The conclusion is made that the ontological status of emotions in language is dual: emotions are related to psychophysiological reality, yet they acquire their own linguistic and cultural-semiotic mode of existence.
Keywords: basic emotions, derived emotions, ontological status, language, linguistics of emotions, emotional concept, categorization, semantics of emotions, emotivity, cognitive linguistics.

The study of emotions occupies a special place in contemporary humanities, as emotions are simultaneously psychophysiological states, forms of subjective experience, socially regulated manifestations of personality, and objects of linguistic representation. In linguistics, interest in emotions centers on how an internal experience acquires linguistic form—how it is named, interpreted, evaluated, and integrated into various types of discourse [1, p. 221].

The distinction between basic and derived emotions is of particular importance. In psychology, basic emotions are typically viewed as primary, universal, and biologically determined human reactions to significant situations; these generally include joy, fear, anger, sadness, disgust, and surprise. Derived emotions—such as guilt, shame, jealousy, pride, resentment, disappointment, gratitude, and anxiety—are characterized by greater cognitive and social complexity.

For linguistics, however, it is crucial not only to classify emotions as basic or derived but also to determine how they exist within language. In other words, it is necessary to address the question of their ontological status: whether emotions in language serve merely as simple labels for internal states, or whether they constitute distinct linguistic and cultural constructs possessing their own structure and semantic dynamics [2, p. 104].

The relevance of this topic stems from several factors. First, contemporary linguistics is increasingly focusing on the anthropocentric paradigm, which views the human being as a subject of cognition, evaluation, and emotional experience. Secondly, emotions constitute a significant subject of interdisciplinary analysis, integrating psychology, cognitive science, semantics, pragmatics, discourse analysis, and cultural studies. Thirdly, distinguishing between basic and derived emotions affords a deeper understanding of the mechanisms underlying the linguistic categorization of emotional experience.

The aim of this article is to define the ontological status of basic and derived emotions within language and to identify the primary modes of their linguistic representation.

To achieve this aim, the following objectives must be addressed:

1. to examine the main approaches to understanding basic and derived emotions;

2. to clarify the concept of the ontological status of emotions in language;

3. to identify differences in the linguistic representation of basic and derived emotions;

4. to characterize the role of language in the categorization and interpretation of emotional experience;

5. to demonstrate that emotions in language possess not only a nominative but also a cognitive-discursive nature.

The methodological framework of the study is based on principles drawn from the linguistics of emotions, cognitive semantics, anthropocentric linguistics, the theory of emotional concepts, and the discourse-based approach to studying emotional experience.

The concept of basic emotions emerged primarily within the fields of psychology and psychophysiology. In the works of P. Ekman, C. Izard, R. Plutchik, and other researchers, basic emotions are viewed as universal, innate, and relatively independent emotional systems. Their universality is linked to pan-human facial expressions, bodily reactions, and adaptive functions. For instance, fear serves a protective function against danger; anger is linked to overcoming obstacles or reacting to boundary violations; disgust involves avoiding harmful or unacceptable objects; joy is associated with experiencing satisfaction and positive outcomes; sadness relates to reactions to loss; and surprise arises from the unexpected or the disruption of predictions.

From a linguistic perspective, basic emotions exhibit several characteristics: they denote relatively simple emotional states, appear frequently in everyday speech, have equivalents across many languages, are often linked to descriptions of facial expressions, gestures, and physiological reactions, typically convey a clear positive or negative evaluation, and actively generate metaphorical models (e.g., "boiling with anger," "freezing with fear").

For example, the emotion of fear is expressed through direct naming—fear, to fear, to get scared, to be horrified—as well as through bodily symptoms: the heart skipping a beat, blood running cold, or legs buckling. These linguistic forms demonstrate that basic emotions are closely tied to bodily experience and are perceived as states that directly affect the human organism.

However, even basic emotions do not exist in language merely as biological reactions. They undergo semantic processing, are incorporated into cultural scripts, and receive evaluative interpretations. For instance, fear might be condemned as a sign of weakness, justified as a natural reaction, or reinterpreted as an expression of responsibility. Consequently, language does not simply name a basic emotion but establishes the framework for understanding it [3, p. 10].

Unlike basic emotions, derived emotions possess a more complex structure. They encompass not only the immediate experience itself but also a cognitive assessment of the situation, as well as concepts regarding norms, responsibility, expectations, guilt, status, and one's attitude toward another person. Derivative emotions include such states as such as shame, guilt, pride, jealousy, resentment, gratitude, envy, disappointment, anxiety, regret, awkwardness, contempt, and sympathy. Derived emotions are often termed social, moral, or reflexive, as they entail a conceptualization of the self in relation to others and to social norms.

Linguistically, derived emotions possess a more complex semantic organization. Their meaning often incorporates an implicit scenario. For instance, the emotion of resentment implies the following situation: the subject expected a certain type of treatment, that expectation was violated, the violation is perceived as unjust, and the subject experiences an emotional reaction and may lodge a moral grievance against the person responsible. Thus, the word resentment denotes not merely an internal state but an entire cognitive-communicative situation. In this regard, derived emotions are particularly revealing for analyzing the ontological status of emotions in language: they demonstrate that a linguistic emotion is not just a "feeling" but also a way of interpreting social experience.

The concept of ontological status, when applied to emotions in language, raises the question of how emotions exist within the linguistic system and in speech practice [4, p. 9]. Several levels of such existence can be distinguished.

At the first level, the emotion corresponds to the subject's actual internal state. A person may genuinely experience fear, joy, anger, anxiety, or shame. In this sense, linguistic units denoting emotions have a referential link to psychological and bodily reality.

For example, the statement "I got scared" refers to an experienced state that may be accompanied by a rapid heartbeat, tension, and an urge to avoid danger. Here, language serves as a means of designating internal experience. However, this connection is neither direct nor mechanical. One and the same state can be labeled in various ways: fear, anxiety, panic, agitation, or foreboding. Consequently, language does not merely reflect an emotion but also classifies it.

At the second level, an emotion exists as a linguistic category embedded in vocabulary, phraseology, grammar, and word formation [5]. Language gives rise to groups of words denoting emotional states, as well as their causes, manifestations, intensity, and consequences. For instance, the emotion of anger is represented by a range of lexical units: wrath, anger/malice, fury, irritation, indignation, outrage, rage/madness, vexation. These words are not exact synonyms; they differ in intensity, evaluative nuance, stylistic register, and typical contexts of use.

Thus, within language, an emotion exists not as a singular object but as a semantic field encompassing various shades of emotional experience.

At the third level, an emotion acquires the status of a concept. An emotional concept comprises not only word meaning but also cultural notions, associations, typical situations, evaluative stereotypes, metaphors, and behavioral scripts. For example, the concept of "fear" includes the notion of danger, bodily reactions, the desire to avoid a threat, the assessment of a situation as unsafe, cultural norms regarding overcoming fear, the contrast between fear and courage, and metaphors involving cold, darkness, constriction, and paralysis. In this sense, the ontological status of an emotion within language extends beyond that of a mere lexical unit; the emotion exists as a fragment of the linguistic worldview, where individual experience, collective representations, and cultural norms converge.

At the fourth level, an emotion exists in discourse as an action. When a person says, "I feel hurt" they are not merely reporting a state but also performing a communicative act: revealing an inner experience, signaling a violation of expectations, and potentially indirectly accusing the addressee or demanding validation of their position. Such an emotional utterance performs several pragmatic functions:

1. it informs others of the subject's state;

2. it evaluates the situation;

3. it assigns responsibility;

4. it constructs an image of the speaker;

5. it influences the addressee;

6. it legitimizes the emotional reaction.

For instance, the statement "I have the right to be angry" expresses not only anger but also the subject's stance in defending their boundaries. The statement "I am ashamed of my actions" not only names the emotion but also demonstrates an acknowledgment of norms and a readiness for moral self-assessment. Consequently, within discourse, emotions possess both an event-like and a social existence: they arise, are interpreted, and undergo change during the process of communication.

Next, we will characterize the primary linguistic means used to represent basic and derived emotions; these are realized across various levels of language: lexical, phraseological, derivational, syntactic, metaphorical, and discursive.

The most obvious way to express emotions is through direct naming: joy, fear, anger, sadness, guilt, shame, anxiety, and a sense of injury or resentment. Lexical naming allows an experience to be categorized and made communicable. Basic emotions are characterized by high frequency and relative semantic simplicity—for example, to rejoice, to fear, to get angry, to feel sad. Derived emotions often require specifying a cause, an object, or a social situation: feeling ashamed of an action, feeling hurt by a friend, being proud of one’s son, feeling jealous of a rival, or feeling guilty toward one’s parents.

Emotions are often expressed not by naming them directly, but by evaluating the situation (e.g., "That’s terrible!", "You shouldn't do that!", "That’s unfair!", "It was hard for me!", "That’s very pleasant"). Evaluative constructions are particularly important for derived emotions, as they link the experience to norms, expectations, and moral judgments. For instance, the statement "That’s unfair" can express hurt, anger, or indignation, even though the specific emotion is not named.

Emotions are often conceptualized through metaphors. For basic emotions, metaphors tend to relate to bodily sensations and physiological intensity: boiling with anger, going cold with fear. For derived emotions, metaphors frequently incorporate moral and social evaluations: the burden of guilt, the wound of hurt, the shadow of shame.

The article’s key question is whether emotions exist in language merely as reflections of pre-existing mental states, or whether language plays a role in shaping the emotions themselves. It appears that both perspectives must be considered. On one hand, emotions have a non-linguistic basis: a person experiences bodily and mental states prior to verbalizing them. On the other hand, it is language that enables us to distinguish, classify, and make sense of these states. A person might experience a vague sense of discomfort but label it as fear, shame, anxiety, guilt, or hurt. Each label imposes a specific interpretation on the experience. For example:

- "I am afraid" — emphasizes danger;

- "I feel anxious" — emphasizes uncertain anticipation;

- "I feel ashamed" — emphasizes the violation of a norm and self-evaluation; - "I am to blame" — emphasis on responsibility;

- "I feel aggrieved" — emphasis on a violated expectation of fairness.

Thus, language does not merely mark an emotional state but defines its semantic framework. This constitutes the specific ontological role of language: it translates an internal experience into a socially significant form.

Emotions in language manifest in the following modes of being: 1) psychophysiological (emotion as an internal state of the organism and psyche), 2) semantic (emotion as the meaning of a linguistic unit), 3) conceptual (emotion as an element of the linguistic worldview), 4) communicative (emotion as an element of the linguistic worldview), 5) discursive (emotion as a way of positioning the subject), and 6) cultural (emotion as a form of socially normative experience).

The analysis leads to the conclusion that basic and derived emotions possess distinct yet interconnected ontological statuses within language. Basic emotions are more strongly linked to embodiment, psychophysiological reactions, and universal adaptation mechanisms. Their linguistic representation frequently relies on direct naming, descriptions of bodily symptoms, intensity, and metaphors of physical impact.

Derived emotions are characterized by greater cognitive, social, and cultural complexity. They involve the assessment of a situation and notions regarding norms, responsibility, expectations, status, and interpersonal relationships. In language, derived emotions exist as scenario-based and conceptual constructs that often require the specification of a cause, an object, and a moral interpretation.

The ontological status of emotions in language cannot be reduced to a simple function of designation. Emotions exist in language simultaneously as names, meanings, concepts, metaphorical models, evaluative schemas, and discursive acts. Language not only reflects emotional experience but also shapes it by establishing ways of categorizing, interpreting, and socially legitimizing lived experience.

Thus, basic and derived emotions in language should be viewed as elements of a complex emotional-semantic system in which biological, psychological, cognitive, social, and cultural factors interact.

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