История

Вызовы, связанные с вовлечением международных организаций в процесс миростроительства в новообразованных государствах: на примере операций ООН в ДРК

Труфанов Глеб Алексеевич
бакалавр конфликтологии, исследователь, факультет гуманитарных дисциплин, кафедра международных отношений, унниверситет Донья Горица, Черногория, Подгорица, valentinothedoctor123@gmail.com
Томин Виталий Вячеславович
кандидат педагогических наук, доцент кафедры иностранных языков, ФГБОУ ВО Институт языков и культур, Оренбургский государственный университет, Россия, Оренбург, vnimot@yandex.ru
Евстафьев Александр Викторович
cтарший преподаватель кафедры "Высшая математика" Санкт-Петербургского Политехнического университета Петра Великого, Россия, Санкт Петербург, evstafev93@mail.ru

Аннотация: События гражданской войны и затяжной период военно-политической нестабильности в ДРК невозможно представить без широкого участия международных организаций таких как ООН. Авторы предприняли попытку комплексного осмысления роли международных организаций в конфликте. Релевантность темы исследования подкрепляется константно увеличивающемся количеством этнических, политических конфликтов, а также интенсификации насилия при противоборстве сторон таких конфликтов. Авторы статьи рассмотрели роль ООН, как посредника в урегулировании конфликта в ДРК. Новизна научных результатов заключается в предложенным авторами ряду ключевых положений по повышению уровня эффективности интервенции международных организаций в вооруженный конфликт. Авторы подчеркивают, что институализация процессов миростроительства, а также создание многосторонних форумов для диалога по вопросам урегулирования конфликта будут способствовать формированию языка общих интересов и потребностей, укреплению решимости акторов политической сферы в контексте урегулирования конфликта.
Ключевые слова: кризис, конфликт, безопасность, урегулирование конфликта, ООН, посредничество.

Trufanov Gleb Alekseevich
B.A. in Conflict Studies, Researcher, Faculty of Humanities, Department of International Relations, Unniversity of Donja Gorica, Montenegro, Podgorica
Tomin Vitaly Vyacheslavovich
PHD in Pedagogical Sciences, Associate Professor of the Department of Foreign Languages, Institute of Languages and Cultures, Federal State Educational Institution of Higher Education Orenburg State University, , Russia, Orenburg
Evstafiev Alexander Viktorovich
Senior Lecturer, Department of Higher Mathematics, Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, Russia, St. Petersburg

Abstract: The events of the civil war and the protracted period of military and political instability in the DRC cannot be imagined without the broad participation of international organizations such as the UN. The authors have attempted to comprehensively understand the role of international organizations in the conflict. The relevance of the research topic is supported by the ever-increasing number of ethnic and political conflicts, as well as the intensification of violence in the confrontation between the parties to such conflicts. The authors of the article considered the role of the UN as a mediator in conflict resolution in the DRC. The novelty of the scientific results lies in several key provisions proposed by the authors to increase the level of effectiveness of intervention of international organizations in an armed conflict. The authors emphasize that the institutionalization of peacebuilding processes, as well as the creation of multilateral forums for dialogue on conflict resolution, will contribute to the formation of a language of common interests and needs, strengthening the determination of political actors in the context of conflict resolution.
Keywords: crisis, conflict, security, conflict resolution, UN, mediation.

Introduction.

The history of conflicts in the DRC is presented as a complex chain of contradictions and clashes that the country has faced since independence. The year 1960 has gone down in history, thanks to the fact that it was marked by the independence of 17 countries on the African continent, among them was the DRC (June 30, 1960). A week later, this state was recognized by the USSR (July 7, 1960), after gaining independence, the DRC became a zone of clash of different interests, in light of which we can say that the conflict state in this region is constant and even to this day, the conflict and negative power interaction to resolve the contradictions led to the legitimization of the manifestations of force scenario in the minds of the citizens of the country, exhausted by constant wars and clashes. According to the results of the parliamentary elections of May 1960, the political party Movement National of Congo (MNDC), headed by its leader, the future Prime Minister of the DRC, Patrice Lumumba, won. Joseph Kasavubu became the first president of the DRC. The USSR, represented by N.S. Khrushchev expressed admiration and promised the DRC "all-round help and assistance" [1]. Lumumba's party promoted the construction of the country according to the canons of unitarianism to prevent separatism in the regions, which was a clear threat to the integrity of the whole country, as a united territory under the leadership of the president and prime minister.

Main results.

Several representatives of the regions lobbied and supported by European countries with strong influence in the region, including Moise Chombe (Konakat party) advocated for a federal structure.

The conflict of interests, the subject of which was the right to practice power in the country was «en route». Separatist speeches were on air. The desire for sole power or its abuse is a complex disease of young states where centripetal acceleration in terms of radicalism is strong. [2], [3], [4] Congolese soldiers revolted against Belgian officers in Low-Congo province. Uprisings spread to other parts of the country. Belgian functionaries were urgently fleeing the country. By July 10, 1960, Belgium had introduced its expeditionary contingents into the DRC, Chombe took advantage of the introduction of his patrons' troops and declared Katanga Province an independent state. After a month, another regional separatist leader, Albert Kalonji, proclaimed the independence of the "Southern Kasai Mining State". Given the threat of the country's collapse, Lumumba and Kasavubu appealed to the UN for help. UN was considered as a prominent mediator, however, sometimes it was considered an instrument for the implementation of plans of questionable ethics. [5], [6], [7], [8] Peacekeeping forces arrived in Congo. The UN peace enforcement operation was relatively successful, but there was soon a rift between the Congolese government and UN functionaries, lying within a disagreement about the nature of measures against Katanga, where separatist sentiment was growing through Belgian support. We cannot leave aside the role of media manipulation and hostile discourse presence in social media. The role of the language as a mediator in communication and agent of delivery of information and its interpretation is crucial. [9], [10] Many scientists highlighted the role of discourse and language in this context. [11], [12] Demonisation and dehumanization always come along with discredited policies as instruments in conflicts. Thus, separatism at this stage was conditioned by a strong foreign policy lobby coupled with internal political disagreements, multiplied by the geographical peculiarities of the DRC, economic factors (competition for resources and subsoil exploitation), weak mutual integration of the territories, poor information provision and relic forms of organization of societies and self-identification.

The object of this conflict is the contradiction stemming from the question of the future structure of the country, its future as a unitary or federal state. Many African states have experienced a phase of territorial structure uncertainty and political uncertainty in terms of a platform for further development. This type of uncertainty and its continuity has become the main foundation for the further formation of contradictions between different groups of interests. Those contradictions form the vacuum for social tension that leads to a crisis in politics. The crisis is a first step for conflict. Identification of the subject of this conflict is complementary and complex, we can say that the subject is multi-level and concentration of contradictions, and mutually exclusive interests. G. Trufanov has highlighted this fact in his previous research regarding problems of conflict regulation. Mutually exclusive interests are the key structures of future negative interaction between actors of any sphere. [13], [14], [15] The main problem in this case is ethnic diversity and its historically determined territorial attachment. The factor of ethnic self-identification with one or the other ethnicity remains prevalent in determining the essence of social and political life on the African continent. The tribal and relic form of organization of societies, which persists everywhere, imposes certain peculiarities on political culture, the formation of political parties, and armed forces. As G.M Sidorova notes, the patronage of ethnocultural interest has evolved to the level of political consciousness and is now expressed in the creation of political and cultural associations, and nationalist parties. [16]

Discussion.

It is worth noting that in the provinces the power of the president and prime minister was only nominal. Each of the six provinces of the DRC had its own "government," and in the peripheral areas, tribal leaders controlled everything. Moreover, the country was flooded with illegal armed gangs that did not want to obey anyone at all.  Later, by September 5, 1960, Patrice Lumumba was removed from office by President Kasavubu, this decision was generated with the support of foreign countries, even against the protest of the parliament of states to weaken the government and strengthen separatist sentiments. The current government was overthrown very soon. The traditional African model of leadership by a military commander, vested with power and poorly controlled, unaccountable to the institution of power, failed the future of the country due to the lack of systematic operations and combined effort. Power itself is not the only prerequisite for success in a revolt against the government. Colonel Mobutu, Chief of General Staff of the DRC army, did not stop at disarming the Prime Minister's supporters and by September 14, 1960, had neutralized the President of the country and the Parliament. Lumumba was handed over to separatist leader Katanga Chomba, subsequently assassinated on January 17, 1961. The country stood on the threshold of a civil war with interventionists and other international command and control forces intervening in the conflict on their terms and with their strategic objectives in the region. [17], [18]  Here we have the complex situation of negative leadership in conflict as a result of the pathogenesis of conflict management of external conflict managers. Those managers-different groups of interest had their plans for operations connected to their economic profit. Politics was only the instrument for achieving those goals. Divide and lead was the basis of that negative leadership.

In January 1963, the UN put an end to Chombe's separatism, and Katanga remained within the DRC. The regime of the new Prime Minister S. Adula was extremely unpopular among the Congolese but was convenient for the West. The country was still stagnating, and the supporters of Lumumba formed into guerrilla groups that launched combat operations against the official authorities, the Congolese army was an unorganized collection of people and ancient weapons and equipment with a complete lack of repair parts, ammunition production, and logistics. Beginning in 1960, mercenaries began to stay in the DRC, and a canonical "West-USSR" confrontation within the framework of the Cold War began (the government in Leapoldville (Kinshasa) suspected the USSR of helping the Lumumba rebels). The civil war in the DRC (1960-1965) - a military-political conflict with large-scale foreign participation and the participation of mercenaries who compensated for the lack of normal human forces and military equipment was characterized by particular brutality. The first thing that should be taken into account is that the DRC gained legal and legitimate, but in some places quite nominal, independence; Western corporations that were and still are operating in the country have not disappeared, they are the most important actors of political influence on the institutional and other structures of the country. [19], [20]

Conflict may play a certain role in politics.  In the case of Congo, the conflict played the role of an agent of manipulation, an instrument of working with interests and obtaining benefits - occupation of positions by certain affiliated people, provocation of clashes between opponents and competitors, and manipulation with the UN. The Belgians, with the participation of capitals of international mining corporations such as Union Miniere, openly supported the separatists of Katanga led by Moises Chombe. Guided by the possibility of further exclusive rights to their activities in the region. Between July 11 and September 8, 1960, more than 100 tons of assorted arms and ammunition were transferred to Katanga. The Belgians also provided Chombe with Belgian Air Force aircraft and personnel. Western countries took an intermediate and moderate position: on the one hand, they blocked anti-Belgian resolutions in the UN, on the other hand, they did not allow Belgium to recognize Katanga's independence, despite even Belgian threats to withdraw from NATO. After the 1960 Elizabethville crisis, the situation did not change for the better. However, Belgium sent an additional contingent to the Congo because the fighting was very heavy and bloody. The government of Patrice Lumumba cut diplomatic relations with Belgium and the Congolese government armed forces began to counter the Belgian contingents in Leopoldville. At that time the UN demanded Belgium to withdraw its troops from the Congo territories. The USSR, represented by Khrushchev, was ready to support the DRC in manning and training the army. In the same 1960, the first UN contingent from Tunisia arrived in Congo, and then the UN Secretary-General D. Hammersheld himself arrived in Katanga and demanded the withdrawal of the Belgians. Chombe was not ready to compromise and withdraw the troops of his allies and deprive himself of military advantage. It is worth noting that Katanga was and is a mining area for minerals such as copper, Katanga is a relatively developed area, the birthplace of the Congolese working class. Already in August 1960, a rebellion started in Kasai province, and Lumumba sent troops to suppress it. A punitive operation resulted in a massacre (10000 victims) in Bakwanga, the capital of the province. By September, the Belgians had left the Congo. Lumumba was ousted, and later Kasavubu was ousted by Col. Mobutu.

By September 20, 1960, the procedure for the DRC to join the UN was completed. In November, Lumumba escaped from prison in Stanleyville in an attempt to rally his supporters and was captured on the way by Gizenga, who declared himself his successor. Thus, by early 1961 there were four governments in Congo: two national governments fighting each other, one in Leopoldville led by J. Kasavubu and J. Mobutu, the other in Stanleyville led by A. Gizenga, deputy prime minister in the government of P. Lumumba, and two separatist governments, one led by M. Chombe in Katanga, the other by Kalonji in South Kasai. Throughout the war, there were internal splits and reshuffles within the separatist parties, and at one time the UN imposed a clause under which they had the right to use arms if the conflict escalated against any separatist provinces. The apogee of the mercenary saga was the capture of Albertville (Watch chain August 1964) with the subsequent release of white hostages taken captive by Lumumbist radicals (Simba). Operation Red Dragon (November 1964), the complete defeat of Simba's rebels, also deserves special mention. Lumumba is dead, Kasavubu is ousted and Mobutu is now the legal president of the DRC. This fact, however, did not make things clearer. Now, the UN had to make contact with four different DRC governments at the same time. One "legal" government, led by Kasavubu-Mobutu, had about 7,000 fighters in the Leopoldville area. The next leader, Gizenga, the "successor" to Patrice Lumumba, had about 5,500 soldiers in Stanleyville in the northeast, supported by the USSR, PRC, United Arab Republic, and many African countries. Moise Chombe had between 5000 and 7000 supporters in Elisabethville. And finally, Albert Kalonji had about 3,000 troops in breakaway Kasai South. All of them considered themselves quite legitimate governments. In the end, it ended in a victory for Mobutu's troops and his mercenaries. Mobutu became president and ruled until 1997.

Conclusion.

The problem of stabilizing the conflict situation in central Africa is complex and multifaceted, and the resolution of this issue is impossible without the active support of the international community and intergovernmental international organizations, which have the role of coordinator of settlement and peace enforcement efforts and authoritative sponsor of many humanitarian and other programs.

The authors of the article come to conclusions about the relevance of building UN peacekeeping operations on a platform of effective conflict management.

Conflict management procedures are proposed to be understood as efforts to resolve conflict based on the following principles:

1) Use of internationally recognized authority to overcome legal and other nihilism among the elites of the states where the peacekeeping operation is being carried out.

2) Involvement in the negotiation process of opinion leaders identified in the process of field operations.

3) Careful consideration of the interests of various groups and building their hierarchy.

4) Developing strategies to find a "third value" in the conflict. Often a conflict is a confrontation between the bearers of incompatible values. It is necessary to find a third value common to both sides, it is necessary to ensure the demonstration of this value to the parties to the conflict as a value without the realization of the existence of other values (because of the incompatibility of which the conflict began) is impossible.

5) It is necessary to recognize the fact that it is impossible to destroy the deep contradictions that have been forming, flowing, and shaping the discourse for long periods. We cannot influence the causes, but we can work with the intensity and destructiveness of their manifestations.

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